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EVIDENCE FROM THE SSI PROGRAM
Abstract
We attempt to draw inferences about the potential behavioral responses to means testing Social
Security by examining the effects of the Supplementary Security Income (SSI) program for the aged on
wealth accumulation and employment.  Part of the SSI program provides payments to the poor elderly,
thus operating as a means-tested public retirement program.  The federal government sets eligibility
criteria and benefit levels for the federal component of the program, but many states supplement federal
SSI benefits substantially.
We exploit the state-level variation in SSI benefits to estimate the effects of SSI on saving and
labor supply.  We use data from waves 4, 5, and 7 of the Survey of Income Program Participation (SIPP),
covering individuals in the 1983-1986 period.  We find evidence that high SSI benefits reduce saving
among households with male heads who are approaching the age of eligibility for SSI for the aged, and
who are likely participants in the program.  But we find little consistent evidence that generous SSI
benefits reduce the labor supply of older men nearing the age of eligibility.  This evidence suggests that a
means-tested Social Security program that bases eligibility or payment levels in part on accumulated
wealth may, consistent with the fears of critics of such a program, discourage saving among those
approaching the age of retirement. 1
I. Introduction
The large projected increases in benefit payments as the baby boom cohort approaches retirement
have spurred interest by policy makers and researchers alike in proposals to reform the Social Security
system.  Broadly speaking, three types of proposals receive most of the attention.  The first is to “tinker”
with the existing system by such means as increasing the retirement age or indexing benefits to a price
index that rises more slowly than the CPI.  The second is to switch from an unfunded system to a fully or
partially privatized, fully-funded system.  The third is to convert Social Security from a universal
entitlement program to a means-tested program that would pay benefits (or perhaps full benefits) only to
those who lack sufficient assets or post-retirement income to finance retirement (Bipartisan Commission
on Entitlement and Tax Reform, 1995).
1  A small means-tested program might also be a component of a
largely privatized system (Mitchell and Zeldes, 1995). 
Evaluation of these alternative types of proposals rests in large part on their effects on revenues
and costs, as well as saving and labor supply (which in turn affect revenues and costs).  There is an
extensive literature that attempts to estimate the effects of changing various parameters of the Social
Security system (e.g., Gustman and Steinmeier, 1984, 1986, and 1991; Burtless and Moffitt, 1985).  This
literature frequently relies on variation in program parameters across time or across individuals to identify
the effects of interest.  There is a newer but burgeoning literature that considers the effects of a privatized
Social Security system (e.g., Altig and Gokhale, 1996; Arrau and Schmidt-Hebbel, 1993; Feldstein, 1995;
Gustman and Steinmeier, 1995; Kotlikoff, 1995; Mitchell and Zeldes, 1996).
2  Research on this latter
question is plagued, of course, by the absence of past experience with a privatized system, and hence tends
                    
     
1In the report of the Bipartisan Commission, Commissioner Peter G.
Peterson (with support from Commissioner Robert E. Denham) proposes applying
an "affluence test" to all entitlement programs, including Social Security. 
This proposal is also advocated by the Concord Coalition.  The affluence test
would apply to payments from all federal benefit programs, and would impose a
ten-percent marginal tax rate on benefits for those earning $40,000-49,999,
with the marginal tax rate higher by ten percentage points for each additional
$10,000 of income.  The maximum benefit reduction would be 85 percent.
     
2For recent reviews of these two types of approaches to Social Security2
to rely more on theoretical and simulation methods, as well as discussion of privatization schemes in other
countries, most notably Chile.
3  Research on the consequences of means-testing Social Security faces a
similar problem, because the program was never means-tested in the past.  Consequently, evaluations of
the benefits and costs of means testing hinge on the unknown effects of such a system.
In addition to reducing projected costs sharply, a potential advantage of means-testing Social
Security is that it would limit the size of the program, and therefore reduce the distortionary effects of the
taxes that are used to finance Social Security.  This reduction in distortions is most likely to occur if the
conversion from universal to means-tested Social Security does not introduce additional adverse
behavioral incentives.  In addition, means testing allows for better targeting of benefits to those most in
need. 
However, as Feldstein (1987) points out, means testing of Social Security may induce other
behavioral responses that offset some of the intended benefits of means testing.  In particular, if future
Social Security benefits depend on the level of financial assets, some individuals may be less likely to save
under a means-tested program.
4  This view appears to be widely held.  In an appendix to the report of the
Bipartisan Commission on Entitlement and Tax Reform (1995), a large number of economists and other
individuals endorse the statement that "Means testing would tax ... saving by cutting Social Security as
income from private saving increases, conveying the message: Don't save or we will punish you for your
frugality by denying you Social Security" (p. 112).
5  This type of response might occur, for example,
among individuals approaching retirement age who have accumulated relatively little pension wealth
                                                                                
reform, see Gramlich (1996) and Diamond (1996). 
     
3Other countries adopting or considering adopting privatized systems
include Argentina, Australia, Bolivia, Columbia, Mexico, Peru, and the U.K.
(Kotlikoff, 1995).
     
4This problem has received more attention, including estimation of
dissaving effects, with respect to the effects of asset limits in the AFDC
program on the savings behavior of potential recipients (Hubbard, et al.,
1995; Powers, 1996). 
     
5This same appendix suggests that means testing of Social Security would
undermine public acceptance of the program.  We have no way of assessing the
validity of this claim. 3
(including Social Security wealth); such workers may do better by saving less (or dissaving) and
qualifying for means-tested Social Security, than by saving more and making themselves ineligible, or
remaining eligible but with reduced benefits.  More generally, the consumption paths of those who choose
not to save--entailing higher consumption before retirement, and lower consumption afterwards--may
yield higher utility if means-tested Social Security benefits paid to non-savers boost post-retirement
consumption sufficiently. 
In addition, while savings seems the most obvious place to look for behavioral responses to a
means-tested retirement program, such a program may also have effects on labor supply before the age at
which an individual would have retired in the absence of such a program.
6  If benefits under a means-tested
system depend in part on the accumulated value of private pensions (possibly as part of a privatized Social
Security system for most workers), then means testing may reduce labor supply.  For example, workers
with accumulated pension wealth sufficiently low to qualify for the means-tested program may face little
added incentive to continue working at older ages in order to increase pension wealth (by, for example,
increasing covered quarters of Social Security employment), as the extra post-retirement income will be
offset against the payments made under the means-tested program, and might make them ineligible.
7  We
think that this influence of a means-tested retirement program is likely to be weaker, because individuals
work to satisfy current needs, and not only to accumulate savings for the future; nonetheless, it seems a
potential influence worth exploring. 
In this paper, we attempt to draw inferences about the potential behavioral responses to means
testing Social Security by examining the effects of the Supplementary Security Income (SSI) program for
the aged on wealth accumulation and employment.  In our view, the SSI program for the aged has many
                    
     
6In Feldstein’s (1987) analysis, labor supply is treated as exogenous. 
     
7With respect to both saving and labor supply, whether or not there are
negative wealth effects would ultimately depend on the generosity of a means-
tested program compared with the current program.  The effects we refer to in
this discussion stem from the implicit taxation of savings and pension wealth
created by a means-tested system.  This issue has parallels to questions
regarding the effects of the earnings test for Social Security.4
parallels to the type of means-tested Social Security program that might emerge from serious reform of the
existing Social Security system, and hence provides potentially useful information on the effects of means-
testing Social Security.  Part of the SSI program provides payments to the poor elderly (aged 65 and
over).
8  The federal government sets eligibility criteria and benefit levels for the federal component of the
program.  The federal government specifies maximum benefit levels for couples and individuals, which
are reduced by income from other sources, including Social Security benefits and Disability Insurance. 
(The first $20 of non-means-tested transfer income, the first $65 of earned income, plus one-half of
remaining earnings, are disregarded in reducing SSI benefits.)  Thus, other sources of income influence the
potential payments under SSI, and, effectively, eligibility.  Financial resources also affect eligibility.  For
example, as of 1985, individuals with over $1600 in countable assets, and couples with over $2400 in
countable assets, were ineligible.
9  In September 1984 (corresponding roughly to the time period covered
by our data), there were 1.55 million persons receiving SSI payments who were eligible because of age
(1995 Green Book).
10
While the federal government sets eligibility criteria and benefit levels, states may supplement
federal SSI benefits.  For example, in January 1985 the maximum federal benefit was $325 for an
individual, and $488 for a couple.  The highest state benefit was in California, which resulted in a
maximum combined benefit of $504 for an individual, and $936 for a couple.
11  In December 1985 the
average federal benefit paid was $146 for individuals, and $232 for couples, and the average state
supplements were $97 and $257, respectively (Kahn, 1987), with 39 percent of SSI recipients receiving
                    
     
8Unlike Social Security, there is no early retirement option in the SSI
program.  However, the SSI program also provides benefits to the blind and
disabled irrespective of age.  We do not consider this component of the
program in most of the analysis in this paper. 
     
9Kahn (1987) discusses the definition of countable assets, and McGarry
(1996) provides more details regarding the SSI program.  
     
10Zedlewski and Meyer (1989) estimate that about 30 percent of the
elderly poor receive SSI benefits.
     
11If states choose to administer the SSI program, they are also free to
set their own eligibility criteria such as asset limits.  However, there is
little variation in these criteria (Social Security Administration, 1985).5
state supplements. 
We exploit the state-level variation in SSI benefits to estimate the effects of SSI on savings and
labor supply.  We use data on male-headed households from waves 4, 5, and 7 of the Survey of Income
Program Participation (SIPP), covering individuals in the 1983-1986 period, estimating the effects of state
SSI supplements via a difference-in-difference approach that controls for variation in saving profiles
across states and across different types of individuals.  We find evidence that high SSI benefits reduce
saving among households with male heads who are approaching the age of eligibility for SSI for the aged,
and who are likely participants in the program.
12   This evidence is generally robust to a variety of changes
in the sample, the specification, or the definition of variables, and the estimated effects generally vary in
the expected direction with some of these changes.  On the other hand, we find little consistent evidence
that generous SSI benefits reduce the labor supply of older men who have characteristics associated with
likely participation in SSI.  This evidence suggests that a means-tested Social Security program that bases
eligibility or payment levels in part on accumulated wealth may, consistent with the fears of critics of such
a program, discourage saving among those approaching the age of retirement.  In addition to their potential
implications for means-testing of Social Security, our findings are also pertinent to understanding the
effects of the SSI program itself. 
II. The Data and Empirical Approach
The Data
We use a sample drawn from the SIPP, which can be used as a nationally-representative sample of
households.  The SIPP attempts to gather detailed and reliable data on income and welfare program use
that are impractical to collect in the larger Current Population Surveys.  Households are interviewed every
four months (each four month interval is referred to as a "wave") for two to three years.  Most questions
are asked retrospectively about the previous four months.  However, questions about wealth holdings refer
                    
     
12For a wider analysis of the effects on savings behavior of asset limits
in various types of welfare programs, see Powers (1995).6
to the last day of the month preceding the sample month.  This paper uses the first (1984) panel of the
SIPP, which covers the period from October 1983 through July 1986.  The primary advantage of this panel
is that it exceeds the size of the next-largest panel by 27 percent.
Dependent variables for the analyses are SSI participation (for those aged 65 and over), and
savings and employment measures (for those aged 40-64).  All equations are estimated for various samples
of male heads of households (including males living alone).
13  Since only those aged 65 or over qualify for
SSI for the aged, a dummy variable for SSI participation is constructed only for a sample of elderly males,
based on participation of the male at any time during wave 4.  Saving is measured as the change in net
wealth excluding housing, from wave 4 to wave 7.
14  This includes all financial assets plus property minus
liabilities.  Although liabilities are not counted against wealth in determining eligibility for SSI, it is
appropriate to subtract them off of the measure we use; because debts can be paid off prior to applying for
SSI, the net wealth measure is the most appropriate measure of the assets with respect to which eligibility
would be determined.
15  Corresponding to the definition of counted wealth under SSI, we exclude
housing.
16  We define the variables with which we measure changes in employment a number of different
                    
     
13The SIPP actually identifies "householders," who are the individuals in
whose name the home is owned or rented.  (These are also referred to as
"reference persons.")  In the case of a married couple owning a house jointly,
either the husband or wife can be listed as the householder.  The data set
documentation provides no guidance as to who is classified as the householder
in this case.  To avoid selecting males who might be less likely to be
classified as heads of household based on other criteria, we selected only
records on male householders.  In fact, the majority of those receiving SSI
for the aged are single women (Kahn, 1987), in part because of greater life
expectancy of women.
     
14The data set does not contain imputation flags to identify those
observations for which wealth data were imputed.  However, we discarded all
observations in which the householder was not interviewed in at least one
month of the wave.  The SIPP weights are adjusted to account for this non-
response. 
     
15The qualitative results were similar using gross rather than net
wealth. 
     
16Vehicles are fully exempt from the SSI means test if they are required for medical reasons or
employment (and are exempt up to $4500 of market value regardless).  Because we have no way to test
whether this condition is met, we do not exclude the value of respondents’ cars.  However, the results
were very similar when vehicles were excluded. 7
ways, as discussed below. 
Each household is assigned a maximum state SSI benefit based on household composition
(whether the household is comprised of an individual or a couple) and state of residence.  In the empirical
analyses, we sometimes use dummy variables indicating whether the state's benefit exceeds a given
percentage of the federal maximum (focusing for the most part on a 20-percent threshold), and at other
times we use a continuous measure of the state supplement.  The continuous measure uses all of the
available information.  On the other hand, all we know about individuals prior to age 65 is the maximum
benefit available, not the benefit they would actually receive.  In addition, the maximum SSI benefits
reported in the Green Book are subject to error for some states.  For three states (Minnesota, Vermont, and
Washington) benefit levels vary by location, and the maximum reported is either for metropolitan areas, in
which benefits are presumably higher, or the Green Book explicitly states that the highest level is reported.
 Since none of these states are classified as paying benefits exceeding 20 percent of the federal level, this
measurement problem does not result in misclassification when this particular threshold is used. 
Regardless of these considerations, the qualitative results are the same using a continuous measure of
maximum benefits or a dummy variable for generous benefits.  Appendix Table A1 summarizes the
variation in state supplemental benefits as of January 1985, taken from the 1985 Green Book, and the
classification of those states paying benefits exceeding 20 percent of the federal level.
17   
Demographic variables in the analysis include race (black or non-black), marital status (married
spouse present, never married, and ever married), and education (less than high school, high school
                    
     
17There are two additional complications with the benefits reported in
the Green Book.  First, in two states (California and Wisconsin) SSI
recipients are denied food stamps, and the cash value of food stamps for which
they would be eligible is instead added to SSI benefits.  However, even after
adjusting the reported maximum benefits downward to account for the food stamp
component, both of these states pay benefits exceeding 20 percent of the
federal benefit, the threshold we use for defining generous benefits in some
specifications.  Second, for two states (Connecticut and Illinois) benefits
are decided on a case-by-case basis, and the Green Book reports that the
maximum benefit is simply an estimate provided by a state official.  To avoid
problems from misclassifying these states with respect to generosity of
benefits, we also report some results when observations from these two states8
graduate, some college, and college graduate).
The Empirical Approach
We are interested in estimating the effects of the potential receipt of SSI benefits on saving and
labor supply.  For now, we generically denote these dependent variables as Y, but refer to saving in the
discussion, since the empirical work focuses mainly on this variable.  Two factors influence the potential
value of SSI benefits: the level of the benefits, and the likelihood of receiving them.  Thus, for example,
we might expect a person with characteristics associated with low permanent income (such as low
education), in a state with high SSI benefits, to be most likely to respond by reducing saving.  In contrast, a
white, married college graduate is extremely unlikely to be eligible for SSI, whether he resides in a state
with high or low benefits.
We begin by examining what the data say about the effects of SSI based solely on variation in the
probability of being eligible for SSI.  By studying workers over age 65, we can identify characteristics
associated with a high likelihood of SSI participation.  We then distinguish among workers under age 65
based on these characteristics, defining a dummy variable “Part” to equal one for likely participants (in
most specifications, based on a chosen threshold for the estimated probability of participating upon
reaching age 65), and zero otherwise.
18  To test our hypothesis, we first estimate an equation of the form:
(1) Y = a×Part×Age4049  + b×Part×Age5059 + g×Part×Age6064  + d + h×Age5059 + q×Age6064 + e ,
where the age variables are dummy variables for the indicated ranges, and the sample includes individuals
aged 40-64.  This can be thought of as a “federal experiment”; state benefit levels do not enter because we
do not use them to construct Part.  The estimates of a, b, and g indicate differences in saving between
individuals likely to be eligible for SSI, and those unlikely to be eligible.  For example, g measures the
                                                                                
are excluded.  
     
18Because financial resources will be one of the endogenous variables we
study, we predict participation based on largely exogenous characteristics,
and not financial resources of the elderly.  Not surprisingly, the latter are
important predictors of SSI participation (McGarry, 1996); of course, given
the possible incentive effects of SSI, these predictors may not be exogenous.9
behavioral difference between 60-64 year-olds likely to be eligible and those unlikely to be eligible
(Y|Part=1,Age6064=1 - Y|Part=0,Age6064=1), and (g - a) measures the difference in the change in Y from ages 40-49 to ages
60-64 between likely participants and non-participants ([Y|Part=1,Age6064=1 - Y|Part=1,Age4049=1] - [Y|Part=0,Age6064=1 -
Y|Part=0,Age4049=1]).  If SSI reduces saving of likely participants, we should find g < 0, because likely participants
are predicted to save less, and (g - a) < 0, because the dissaving of likely participants should accelerate as
they approach the age of eligibility for SSI.    
We focus mostly on estimates of g or (g - a)--rather than b, (b - a), etc.--because, for a number of
reasons, we expect the effects of SSI to be strongest for older workers.  First, given stochastic influences
on wealth and earnings, older workers can form better predictions of post-retirement assets and income. 
Second, we suspect that workers pay more attention to the potential receipt of SSI benefits as they
approach the age of eligibility.  Finally, with respect to saving in particular, because the asset limit rules
do not preclude rapid dissaving near the age of eligibility (although they do prohibit asset transfers),
younger individuals are more likely to maintain higher asset levels for precautionary reasons, and only to
run them down near the age of eligibility.  Hence, in the ensuing discussion, we focus on estimates of the
effects of SSI on changes in behavior as individuals approach retirement, although the other parameters
are reported.  In addition, (g - a) is identified from differences in behavior across cohorts, which requires
the assumption of constant behavior across cohorts.  In contrast, identification of g does not require this
assumption.  We therefore focus much more on estimates of g.
19       
Of course, while the estimates of a, b, and g in equation (1) could represent the effects of the SSI
program, the estimates are based on a rather tenuous identifying assumption--namely, that in the absence
of the program the saving behavior of households with men with characteristics associated with SSI
participation would be the same as those of other households.  That is, the group for which Part = 0 (for
example, highly-educated men) serves as the “control group” for the estimation of the effects of SSI.  It
                    
     
19Attanasio (1993) presents evidence of differences in savings profiles
across cohorts born between 1925 and 1939, cohorts that largely coincide with10
seems likely, however, that age profiles of saving differ systematically with variables such as education,
marital status, and race, regardless of the existence or level of SSI benefits.  In this case, estimation of
equation (1) will lead to biased estimates of the effects of SSI. 
This is the reason we exploit state-level variation in the provision of SSI benefits.  Individuals in
states without state supplementation of SSI benefits, but with characteristics associated with SSI receipt,
serve as a much more compelling control group with which to compare the behavior of individuals in
states with state supplementation, and with characteristics associated with SSI receipt.  At the same time,
state-specific saving profiles may also differ in ways that are correlated with SSI benefits.  Therefore, we
want to identify the effects of SSI from differences between the behavior of likely participants in
supplement and non-supplement states and the behavior of unlikely participants in these two types of
states, using the unlikely participants to control for these state differences. 
Thus, rather than using equation (1), we use a difference-in-difference framework that identifies
the effects of SSI from the difference--between states that do and do not supplement SSI--in the difference
between individuals likely to participate in SSI, and individuals unlikely to participate in SSI.  For
example, older high school dropouts (who are much more likely to be SSI participants) may save less than
older more-educated workers.  But the difference-in-difference framework only infers an effect of SSI if
the difference between the saving of older high school dropouts and older more-educated workers is larger
in states that supplement SSI than in states that do not. 
One simple way to think about the approach is to divide states into those that do and do not
supplement SSI.  We then estimate equation (1) only for the subset of states that do not supplement SSI,
and a similar equation
(2) Y = a'×Part×Age4049  + b'×Part×Age5059 + g'×Part×Age6064  + d' + h'×Age5059 + q'×Age6064 + e'  ,
for the states that supplement SSI.  Estimates for these two subsamples provide the relevant difference-in-
                                                                                
the age groups that we study in this paper.11
difference estimates.  For example, focusing on 60-64 year-olds, g' and g each measure the difference in
behavior of likely vs. unlikely participants within a particular type of state (i.e., high- and low-supplement
states).  g serves as the “baseline” difference in behavior of those with characteristics associated with
participation in SSI, and therefore (g’ - g) captures the effect of SSI supplements on the saving of likely
participants. 
Note that, as discussed above, this framework allows the age profile of saving for the population
as a whole in a state (captured in d, h, and q, or d', h', and q') to differ between states that do and do not
supplement SSI.  This is potentially important to control for biases that might arise from a relationship
between policy and other sources of variation in the level or age distribution of Y in a state (for example, if
states in which individuals have greater wealth or higher saving tend to offer more generous SSI
supplements).  This can be thought of as the analogue to introducing fixed state effects, capturing the
relationship between policy and the distribution of Y that arises for reasons other than responses of the
likely participants; because we have a single cross section, we model these state effects in a more
restrictive fashion than introducing state dummy variables. 
However, differences between (d, h, and q) and (d’, h’, and q’) could also reflect effects of state
differences in the tax treatment of wealth.  If such differences reduce saving of the relatively affluent in
the same states that offer generous SSI benefits, then difference-in-difference estimates of the effects of
SSI on saving will be biased against finding dissaving effects.  We examine evidence on this issue below.
While we report some estimates of equations (1) and (2) to clarify the approach, we rely more
heavily on difference-in-difference estimates from an interactive specification estimated for the pooled
sample of states, of the form:
(3) Y = a×Part×Age4049  + b×Part×Age5059 + g×Part×Age6064  + d + h×Age5059 + q×Age6064
          + a'×Part×Age4049×Supp  + b'×Part×Age5059×Supp + g'×Part×Age6064×Supp
       + d'×Supp + h'×Age5059×Supp + q'×Age6064×Supp + e ,12
where for now "Supp" is a dummy variable for generous SSI supplements.  In this specification the
estimate of g’ is the difference-in-difference estimate of the effect of SSI on Y for those aged 60-64 (and
the estimate of  (g’ - a') measures the effect on the change in Y from ages 40-49 to ages 60-64).
20,21  One
advantage of the pooled regression is that it lets us easily assess the statistical significance of our
difference-in-difference estimates, since the estimates are obtained from a single estimation.  When Supp
is a continuous measure, g', for example, captures the effect of an additional dollar of supplementary state
SSI benefits on the difference in saving between likely participants and unlikely participants aged 60-64,




Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for men aged 65 and over, classified by whether or not they
are actual SSI participants.
22  The differences between the two subgroups are notable.  The average wealth
of participants is about $2600, versus more than $30000 for non-participants; the medians also reflect a
large difference, although median wealth for participants is much lower.
23  Participants are much more
                    
     
20For example, the difference-in-difference parameter capturing the
effect of generous state SSI supplementation on the level of Y for likely
participants aged 60-64 is
(Y|Supp=1,Part=1,Age6064=1 - Y|Supp=1,Part=0,Age6064=1) - (Y|Supp=0,Part=1,Age6064=1 -
Y|Supp=0,Part=0,Age6064=1)  =
(g + d + q  + g' + d' + q' - d - q - d' - q') - (g + d + q - d - q ) = g.'
     
21In principle, we could also use variation over time in state
supplemental benefit levels, and hence use the earlier observations on likely
participants in a state as a “control group.”  However, variation over time in
state supplements is minimal, with many states staying fixed (nominally) from
year to year, and most states having only small changes over longer periods
(Green Book 1984, 1985, 1986, 1990, 1991).
     
22Unfortunately, we cannot distinguish between those who entered the
program for the aged after their 65th birthday, and those who entered the
program for the disabled at an earlier age. 
     
23This estimated wealth of SSI participants is high relative to medians
for the distribution of countable assets of SSI recipients reported by the
Social Security Administration in a 1987 Quality Assurance Review (Scott,
1989).  This may reflect incentives to understate assets on a survey done by13
likely to have less than a high school education, and virtually guaranteed not to be college
graduates.  They are also more likely to be black, and never married, divorced, widowed, or separated.
The table also reveals differences in state SSI supplementation in the states of residence of
participants versus non-participants.  Surprisingly, perhaps, participants are less likely to reside in states
that supplement SSI.  This presumably occurs because of greater concentration of SSI recipients in poorer
states that are also less likely to supplement benefits.   However, participants are more likely to reside in
states with generous SSI supplements; for example, the table shows that recipients are more likely to
reside in states in which SSI supplements exceed 20 percent of federal benefits (all such figures refer to
maximum benefits), and the average maximum benefit in states in which participants reside is somewhat
higher than the average benefit facing non-participants.
24 
Table 2 reports results from estimates of probit models for SSI participation.  Panel A, which
reports the probit estimates for the sample of those aged 65 and over, shows that many of the univariate
differentials with respect to SSI participation apparent in Table 1 continue to hold in this multivariate
analysis.  Specifically, having left school prior to completing high school, and black or never married, are
significantly associated with higher probabilities of SSI participation.  In column (3) we add a dummy
variable for whether the state of residence supplements benefits.  Its estimated coefficient is negative,
paralleling the negative differential in the univariate analysis in Table 1, but insignificant.  But if we
include instead a dummy variable for whether the state provides a supplement greater than 20 percent of
the federal supplement (column (4)), or a continuous variable for the maximum supplement (column (5)),
                                                                                
the Social Security Administration, or differences in the part of the survey
instrument used to measure wealth.
     
24The maximum benefit (whether federal or state) is higher for married
couples than individuals.  Benefits are also lower if one's spouse is below
age 65, in which case only the benefit for individuals is paid, and benefits
are generally also reduced if one lives in another person's household.  In our
data set, only marital status is used to define the maximum benefit.  Since
our results are the same whether we use a continuous supplement measure or a
dummy variable indicating generous benefits in a state, this is
inconsequential, although it may have some minor influence on the estimates in
Tables 1 and 2 that use an actual level of (maximum) benefits. 14
the association with SSI participation is positive and statistically significant.  Thus, the generosity of state
SSI supplements appears to affect program participation. 
The probit estimates in column (2) are used to predict probabilities of participation in SSI for
those aged 40-64, to construct the Part variable in equations (1)-(3).  Panel B reports on the distribution of
these predicted probabilities for this subsample.  As the various centiles indicate, the median predicted
probability is quite low (about .01), while the predicted probability becomes non-negligible by the 75th
centile, and climbs rapidly between the 90th and 100th centiles.  For most of the results we present, we
define Part based on the 75th centile.  Based on the proportion of participants among those aged 65 and
over,  approximately one in five of those above this centile should end up on SSI.  It may seem preferable
to use a higher cutoff, to isolate the effects of SSI on those who are likely to participate in SSI with much
greater certainty.  However, using a higher cutoff for Part entails some offsetting influences.  On the one
hand, the higher probability of participation should induce more dissaving.  On the other hand, those with
higher probabilities may not engage in nearly as much dissaving, since they may have little accumulated
wealth; they may, in fact, not have to engage in any dissaving at all.  In other words, the effects of SSI on
the extremely poor may be of little interest, if they do not save anyway.  Rather, the most interesting
question may be whether higher SSI benefits generate dissaving among those with some chance of going
on SSI, but who would otherwise accumulate assets above the asset limits.  It is the potential disincentive
effects for this group that are presumably at the heart of the fears regarding means-tested retirement
programs.  Nonetheless, in the empirical analysis we also consider evidence using different cutoffs to
define likely participants. 
Effects on Saving
Based on some of the results from Table 2, in Table 3 we begin to examine the effects of SSI on
saving, now turning to men aged 40-64.
25  In the first two columns of Panel A, we simply present estimates
                    
     
25Of course, the rules of the SSI program may allow conversion of
financial assets into other forms of non-counted wealth (such housing, some15
of the age profile of savings, for the full sample.  Column (1) reports OLS estimates.  Because of
numerous extremely influential observations, the standard errors of these estimates are huge.  Column (2)
instead reports median regression (LAD) estimates.  The standard errors fall by a factor of 16 or more.
Robust (Huber) regressions yielded similar results.  Columns (3)-(6) report estimates corresponding to the
federal experiment described above.  In columns (3) and (4) we classify the men in the sample as likely
participants if they failed to complete high school.  In columns (5) and (6) we classify them based on
estimated probabilities of participation, using the estimated probit model in column (2) of Table 2; this is
the fullest specification that does not use information on state supplementation of SSI.  We chose an
estimated cutoff for the predicted probability of .058, which covers the 75th centile of the weighted
distribution of predicted probabilities, giving us roughly the same proportion of likely SSI participants
based on this classification as we get based on the high-school dropout classification.
26
The OLS estimates in columns (3) and (5) indicate that likely participants have lower savings in
the 60-64 age range.  However, the OLS estimates are implausibly large, and again the standard errors are
huge.  We therefore focus only on the median regression estimates, and in subsequent analyses do not
report OLS estimates. 
The results of the federal experiment in columns (4) and (6) are quite consistent with the
hypothesized dissaving effects of SSI.  Whether we classify likely participants based on dropping out of
high school, or estimated probabilities of participation, the estimated dissaving effects are negative and
significant, and become larger in absolute value as the respondents approach age 65.  By looking at the
estimated coefficients of the age dummy variables, we can compare the savings profiles of likely
participants and unlikely participants.  The estimates in column (4), for example, indicate that men aged
                                                                                
durable goods, etc.).  Thus, literally speaking, we are mainly estimating the
effects on changes in financial wealth, and it is conceivable that we are only
detecting asset composition effects. 
     
26In Table 1, the proportion of men aged 65 or older with less than a
high school education is over .5.  This falls by nearly half among men aged
40-64.16
60-64 who are unlikely to participate in SSI save $1332 per year (61 + 1271).  Those likely to participate,
in contrast, dissave $1043 (1332 - 2375).  Column (6) yields similar results. 
However, as explained in the previous section, while these estimates could reflect the effects of
SSI, they may also reflect systematic differences in saving behavior (or initial wealth endowments) based
on characteristics associated with participation in SSI.  Thus, in Panel B we instead perform a difference-
in-difference analysis, exploiting the state-level variation in SSI supplementation.  As mentioned above,
from this point we only report median regression estimates; we also restrict attention to the classification
of likely participants based on the estimated probability of participation.   
First, column (1) reports estimates of the same equation for individuals in states that do not
supplement SSI.  These estimates are not very different from those for the full sample in column (6) of
Panel A.  Column (2) reports estimates for individuals in states that supplement SSI.  Recall that the
difference between the estimated coefficients of ages 60-64 ´ likely participant, for example, provides the
difference-in-difference estimate of the effect of SSI on savings of those aged 60-64.  In this case, this
difference is -1443, which suggests weaker dissaving effects than does the corresponding federal
experiment in Panel A.
We saw previously that there may be a qualitative difference between states that provide large
supplemental benefits, and those that provide minor supplemental benefits, of which there are many (see
Appendix Table A1).  Thus, in column (3) we instead report estimates of equation (2) for the subsample
residing in states in which state supplements exceed 10 percent of federal benefits.  This strengthens the
evidence that SSI reduces saving of individuals aged 40-49 and 50-59, but not aged 60-64, as the estimates
of a' and b' are more negative (and both significant at the ten-percent level or better) than the
corresponding estimates of a and b for the non-supplement sample.  However, the opposite is true for the
estimates of g and g'.  In column (4) we identify a subset of states with more generous supplementation,
based on the state supplement exceeding 20 percent of federal benefits, which focuses on a much smaller17
set of states.  In this case, the evidence of dissaving effects of SSI is stronger for all age groups, relative to
the estimates in column (2).  Finally, in column (5) we raise this threshold even higher, to 40 percent,
which leaves us with four states in the "treatment" group: California, Colorado, Connecticut, and
Massachusetts.  For those aged 60-64, these estimates provide even stronger evidence of dissaving effects.
 Thus, the evidence in Panel B of Table 3 is largely consistent with higher SSI benefits reducing saving
among individuals nearing the age of eligibility.  Any comparison of states that supplement SSI with states
that do not indicates that older men who are likely participants save relatively less in the former than in the
latter.  Furthermore, the estimated dissaving effect becomes larger the more narrowly we define the
treatment group to be those men in states with high state supplementation. 
Table 4 turns to a more thorough analysis of the estimated effects of SSI on saving.  First, to make
interpretation of the results easier, we report results for the fully interactive single equation (3), which lets
us directly assess the statistical significance of the difference-in-difference estimates.  In this table, we use
only the classification of likely participants based on a relatively high estimated probability of
participation.  In specification (1), we use the 20-percent threshold to classify states that provide generous
supplementation.  The last estimated coefficient (-2897) is precisely the difference-in-difference estimate
(of  g’) that we get from a comparison of columns (4) and (1) in Panel B of Table 3.  However, now we
obtain a standard error for this estimate, and see that it is statistically significant at the ten-percent level. 
The first column of Table 5 provides some assistance in interpreting these estimates, by reporting
the implied saving for each type of individual classified by age, residence in a supplement or non-
supplement state, and likely participation.  The table reveals that the estimated dissaving effect from the
difference-in-difference analysis is driven not by differences in saving behavior between likely
participants in supplement and non-supplement states, but rather by differences in the saving behavior of
unlikely participants in these two types of states, which lead to rather sharp differences between the saving
of likely and unlikely participants in supplement states relative to non-supplement states.  To see this, note18
that the estimated saving of 60-64 year-old likely participants is actually slightly higher in supplement
states than in non-supplement states (90 vs. -33).  On the other hand, the estimated saving of 60-64 year-
old unlikely participants is much higher in supplement states (4696 vs. 1676), leading to a large
difference-in-difference estimate of the dissaving effect of generous SSI supplementation ({90 - (-33)} -
{4696- 1676} = -2897).  We do not think that the fact that the dissaving effect is driven by saving
differences among unlikely participants renders the evidence invalid.  However, it is important to
understand the source of the effect that we identify, and we would not dispute the argument that the
evidence would be stronger if qualitative evidence of dissaving emerged whether or not we differenced out
the saving behavior of unlikely participants.  Most importantly, though, this evidence implies that it is very
important to control for other possible sources of differences in savings behavior between likely and
unlikely participants that differ across states--such as the tax treatment of wealth discussed above--to be
more confident that we are picking up effects of the SSI program.  Intuitively, the difference-in-difference
estimation relies on the assumption that--aside from the effects of SSI supplements--there are
commonalities in the behavior of individuals within a state, whether they are likely or unlikely
participants; this assumption is more plausible to the extent that we have controlled for sources of
differences between likely and unlikely participants within a state. 
We now turn to more detailed analysis of the difference-in-difference estimation, with a particular
focus on other factors that might differ across states and therefore underlie our estimated dissaving effects
of SSI.  In specification (2) of Table 4 we add demographic control variables.  This results in a somewhat
weaker estimate of the dissaving effect for those aged 60-64, as the estimate of g' falls (in absolute value)
and becomes insignificant.
In specification (3) we use the full sample (including those states with supplements less than 20
percent of federal benefits), and employ a continuous measure of the maximum state supplement.  While
subject to some measurement error, this specification uses more observations and more information.  We19
find that the estimated dissaving effect in the 60-64 age range is strong and statistically significant at the
five-percent level.  To interpret the estimates, column (2) of Table 5 reports the implied saving for each
classification of the respondent, evaluated at the mean state supplement for observations in supplement
states.  In this case, in contrast to the dummy variable specification, saving of likely participants aged 60-
64 is lower in supplement states than in non-supplement states (215.4 vs. 303).  In addition, the difference
between the estimated saving of unlikely participants aged 60-64 in supplement and non-supplement states
is smaller (3982.4 - 2050 vs. 4696 - 1676).  Nonetheless, the dissaving effect is still largely driven by
covariation between the saving behavior of unlikely participants and the level of the state's
supplementation of SSI. 
The next two columns consider problems that arise in measuring features of state SSI programs. 
First, as mentioned earlier, some states choose to administer their own programs, in which case they can
set their own eligibility criteria.  In specification (4) of Table 4 we report results for the subset of states
with federal administration of SSI (based on information in Kahn, 1987), to ensure that we are looking at
states with federal administration and therefore identical asset limits.  This is potentially important because
in a state with asset limits that differ from the federal limits, one can be eligible for the state but not the
federal benefit, or vice versa.
27  As a result, for states with different asset limits, it is difficult to identify
the appropriate maximum benefit level.  However, the estimates for this subsample are very similar to
those for the full sample, although the estimated dissaving effect for 60-64 year-olds is no longer
statistically significant, perhaps because of the smaller sample size.  Second, as explained earlier, for two
states (Connecticut and Illinois) maximum SSI benefits may not be measured well.  Hence, in specification
(5) of Table 4 we exclude these states; this has virtually no effect on the estimates, and the estimate for 60-
64 year-olds is statistically significant. 
The next issue we consider is the potentially confounding influences of other policies that vary by
                    
     
27McGarry (1996) notes that this occurs frequently. 20
state.  We first consider the influence of other means-tested transfer programs, which may have their own
asset limits, on the estimates reported so far.  Given that a state with high SSI supplements is also likely to
offer relatively generous benefits in other transfer programs, it is possible that the dissaving effects of SSI
that we find actually reflect responses to resource limits of programs other than SSI for the aged.
28  These
programs might tend to be used by older individuals because of declining health (increasing the probability
of qualifying for disability).  Thus, specification (6) excludes those individuals who received any income
from means-tested transfer programs during the four months covered by the SIPP wave.  This should
include General Assistance, AFDC (from other individuals living in the household), and disability
payments via SSI.  This estimation should be largely free from bias from the effects of other transfer
programs (including SSI for the disabled).  The estimated effects of SSI are similar to those in the other
columns, although again the estimated dissaving effect on those aged 60-64 becomes insignificant. 
However, the similarity of the coefficient estimates suggests that our estimates of the effects of SSI do not
confound effects of asset limits of transfer programs other than SSI for the aged.  In specification (7) we
instead omit all individuals who report a disability that impairs their ability to work.  Such a disability may
make them eligible for SSI for the disabled, which raises the same problem as do other transfer programs. 
In addition, because disabilities may have profound effects on wealth and saving, it is useful to sort out
such effects from those that may be induced by SSI, by looking at the population that does not report such
a disability.  These estimates indicate considerably stronger dissaving effects in the 60-64 age range for
this subsample.  This may be because SSI benefits for the disabled are closely linked to those for the aged,
so disabled individuals in high-supplement states take steps considerably earlier to decumulate assets,
generating sharper declines in the 60-64 age range in high-supplement states for the non-disabled. 
Next, as discussed in Section II, factors such as the tax treatment of wealth may generate
differences between saving behavior of unlikely participants in supplement and non-supplement states,
                    
     
28For example, states that offer high SSI supplements for the aged also
offer high SSI supplements for the disabled.21
hence biasing the difference-in-difference estimates of the effects of SSI supplements.  To examine this
question, we identify states that have either gift taxes (which tax gifts while living) or estate or inheritance
taxes.
29  It turns out that states with generous supplementation of SSI are overrepresented among the states
that do not tax estates, inheritances, or gifts.
30  If such taxes reduce saving among the wealthy, this may
help to explain the higher saving among unlikely participants in supplement states, which Table 5 showed
underlies much of the difference-in-difference estimate of the dissaving effect of SSI on likely
participants.  To examine this possibility, we augmented equation (3) by letting the saving profile differ in
states with each of these two types of taxes, adding interactions between the exhaustive set of age dummy
variables and two dummy variables: one for gift taxes, and one for estate or inheritance taxes.  This should
eliminate the influence of differences in the tax treatment of wealth across states.  However, as the table
shows (specification (8)), this has no effect on the results, as the difference-in-difference estimate of the
effect of saving on likely participants aged 60-64 remains negative and statistically significant, with the
magnitude little changed.  In results not reported in the table, we also included interactions between each
of these variables involving tax treatment of wealth and Part, to allow for different effects of the tax
treatment of wealth on likely and unlikely participants.  While the estimated coefficients of these latter
interactions were imprecise, the estimates of a', b', and g'--which in this case are identified from
differences in saving among those in states that do not impose taxes on estates, inheritances, or gifts--were
very similar to those reported for specification (8).  In particular, the estimate of g' was -12.55, significant
at the ten-percent level. 
                    
     
29More precisely, with reference to estate taxes, this refers to states
that impose more than the federal "pick up" tax, which is the amount of state
tax on estates that the federal government permits taxpayers to offset dollar-
for-dollar against federal estate taxes.  All states impose this pick up tax.
 (Details are provided in Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations,
1987.)
     
3017 states tax estates or inheritances, and seven tax gifts.  Of the 16
states with benefits exceeding ten percent of the federal level, ten are in
states that impose no such taxes.  Of the seven states with benefits exceeding
20 percent of the federal level, five are in states that impose no such taxes.22
We next turn to a specification that experiments with alternative thresholds for classifying
respondents as likely participants based on the estimated probability of participation in SSI.  In particular,
rather than having a single cutoff for the estimated probability of participation in order to be classified as a
likely participant, we define three--at the 55th, 75th (as before), and 95th centiles.  We then augment
equation (3) by introducing the corresponding interactions with the age dummy variables, and with the age
and supplement variables.  The prediction here is actually ambiguous, as discussed above.  On the one
hand, those with a higher probability of participation are more likely to pay attention to the incentives
created by SSI, since they are more likely to be eligible.  On the other hand, they may have little (if any)
dissaving to do.  The estimates (which come from a single equation) are reported in columns (9)-(9'') of
Table 4.  For those aged 60-64, we actually find that the estimated dissaving effect of SSI rises with the
probability of participation used to define likely participants.  Moreover, for each of these three cutoffs the
estimated dissaving effect is significant at either the five- or ten-percent level.  This provides further
confirming evidence of a dissaving effect of SSI.
The next two specifications use alternative measures of wealth.  First, in specification (10) we
exclude equity in vehicles from the definition of wealth used to measure saving; wealth excluding vehicles
corresponds more closely to countable wealth if cars are exempt.  As the estimates indicate, the qualitative
conclusions are the same.  The estimate of g' is negative and significant at the five-percent level.  In fact,
when we re-estimated all of the specifications in Table 4 discussed so far using this definition of wealth,
the evidence of dissaving effects of SSI was stronger, as the estimates of g' were always negative and
significant.  We chose to report most results using the alternative measure of wealth to present more
conservative estimates.  In specification (11) we use gross wealth instead of net wealth, so we do not
subtract liabilities.  We argued earlier that this definition of wealth, while technically closer to countable
wealth, gives a misleading indication of the asset position a person is likely to be in when applying for
SSI.  Regardless, the results are again qualitatively similar, as the estimate of g' is negative and significant23
at the ten-percent level.
31
Finally, to this point we have focused on a dependent variable--saving--that is hypothesized to be
affected by the incentives posed by SSI.  Generally, we have found evidence of the hypothesized dissaving
effects.  It is conceivable, however, that other sources of differences in saving or the accumulation of
wealth underlie these results.  One way to check this is to look at a source of wealth that should not be
affected by SSI, and verify that it is not affected.  Specifically, in specification (12) we look at the change
in housing equity, a variable that might be correlated with other changes in wealth, but should not be
influenced by SSI since housing is excluded from countable wealth.  As the table shows, there is no
evidence that higher SSI supplements are associated with the same kinds of declines in housing wealth that
we see when we look at non-housing wealth.
32  In fact, if anything higher supplements are associated with
increased housing wealth in the 40-49 age range, which is consistent with changes in asset composition
toward non-counted wealth, although the ages at which this effect appears suggest that it is not the mirror
image of the declines in non-housing wealth that occur at older ages. 
To summarize, the results based on state-level variation in SSI supplements provide what we
regard as rather compelling evidence that SSI for the aged discourages saving among those approaching
the age of eligibility.
33  The evidence is generally statistically significant, the signs of the estimated effects
on saving are consistently negative, and the results from a variety of sensitivity analyses often result in the
expected changes in the magnitudes of the estimated effects.  In addition, we always find larger point
estimates of dissaving effects for those nearest the age of eligibility, as we would expect. 
                    
     
31For both of these alternative definitions of wealth, the statistical
evidence of dissaving was stronger using the dummy variable for generous SSI
benefits (based on the 20 percent threshold) than using the continuous
measure; in both cases the estimate of g' was negative and significant at the
five-percent level. 
     
32Note that here we report robust regression estimates rather than median
regression estimates, because of the large spike at zero in the distribution
for the change in housing wealth. 
     
33If among those individuals who are likely participants, those who save
relatively less face higher mortality, there is bias against finding that high
SSI benefits reduce saving, as only the higher savers among the likely24
Effects on Labor Supply
As noted earlier, while most of the concern regarding means-tested retirement programs centers on
saving, it is also conceivable that such programs affect labor supply, as individuals approaching the age of
eligibility have reduced incentives to accumulate pension wealth (including Social Security wealth). 
However, we find little evidence of such effects.  Table 6 reports results from a variety of approaches to
this problem.  First, column (1) reports estimates of a probit for employment in wave 4, with employment
defined as the respondent reporting average usual hours worked per week in wave 4 exceeding zero.  The
estimate of g' measures the difference-in-difference estimate on employment of those aged 60-64.  This
estimate is negative, consistent with a disemployment effect, but insignificant.  A parameter of more
interest might be the change in employment from a younger age range to ages 60-64.  As an example, the
fourth row of the table reports the estimate of (g' - a'), which measures the change in employment from
ages 40-49 to ages 60-64.   This estimate is also negative but statistically insignificant.  
Labor supply effects may also show up in hours.  Therefore, in column (2) we report Tobit
estimates for hours worked (defined as average usual weekly hours in the four months covered by the SIPP
wave).  The qualitative results are similar to those for employment.  In particular, the difference-in-
difference estimate of the effect of SSI benefits on the hours of likely participants aged 60-64 is negative 
(-.64) and insignificant, while the effect on the change in hours from ages 40-49 to 60-64 is stronger        
(-1.14) but still insignificant. 
While the estimates of (g' - a') attempt to measure changes in behavior as individuals age, these
effects of SSI on changes in employment and hours are not identified from actual changes in the behavior
of individuals, but rather from differences in behavior across cohorts.  A better strategy may be to study
changes in individual behavior.  In columns (3) and (4) we take a step in this direction by reestimating the
                                                                                
participants survive.  (See Jianakoplos, et al., 1989, and Menchik, 1993.)25
employment probit and hours tobit conditioning on past employment or hours.  Although a structural
interpretation of such equations is problematic, they have the virtue of identifying relatively more of the
effect from changes, especially in the case of the tobit where the estimated coefficient on lagged hours is
.81, so we are nearly estimating an equation for the change in hours.  These estimates provide even less
evidence of an effect of SSI on labor supply, in terms of reductions in labor supply for older workers in the
past year, as the estimates of g' are actually positive (but small and insignificant).  In column (5) we take a
similar approach, estimating a probit model for whether hours fell in the past year.  Here, the estimated
signs of g' (and b') are again in the opposite direction of the hypothesized reductions in labor supply,
although they are insignificant.  Given the lack of any consistent evidence that generous SSI supplements
reduce labor supply, we forego the detailed sensitivity analysis that we undertook for saving. 
IV. Conclusion
The goal of this paper is to draw inferences about the potential consequences of means testing
Social Security by studying the effects of SSI for the aged, which effectively operates as a means-tested
retirement program, in that eligibility depends on financial resources in the form of assets and income.  In
particular, we examine the effects of SSI on saving and on labor supply at ages near retirement.  We
primarily use state-level variation in generosity of supplemental SSI payments to identify the effects of
SSI, studying a sample of male household heads.  We find consistent evidence that SSI reduces the saving
of men nearing the age of retirement, which is the anticipated effect of a means-tested retirement program.
 However, we find no evidence that such programs reduce labor supply of men nearing the age of
retirement. 
In our view, for a number of reasons these results must be used cautiously both as evidence on the
effects of SSI, and as evidence on the likely consequences of means-testing Social Security.  With respect
to the evidence on the effects of SSI, we think that a more definitive answer awaits additional analyses
using other data sets, especially with regard to wealth data for which alternative data sets have adopted26
methods that appear to significantly improve the quality of such data (see, e.g., Smith, 1995).
With respect to using our findings regarding SSI to infer the likely consequences of a means-tested
Social Security program, there are three problems.  First, the structure of such a program might be
sufficiently different from SSI that our results would not generalize.  Second, if the alternative to the
means-tested program either operates or is perceived to operate very differently from the current Social
Security system, behavioral responses to a means-tested program might differ from the responses to SSI
that we estimate.  Finally, the SSI program serves a poor population, whereas Social Security, even if
means tested, would likely continue to serve a higher-income population for which behavioral responses
might differ.  Obviously, our results speak most directly to proposals that entail a small means-tested
program for the needy.   
Despite these qualifications, in the absence of the type of information we might be able to obtain
following implementation of a means-tested Social Security program, we view our evidence on the
potential responses to means-tested Social Security as informative with respect to two issues regarding the
effects of such a program.  First, such behavioral responses may reflect distortions, given that benefits (and
the taxes to pay for them) are not pure lump-sum transfers.  If any such distortions reduce economic
efficiency, empirical evidence on behavioral responses to means-tested programs may be useful in
considering alternative proposals to reform Social Security.  For example, Mitchell and Zeldes (1996)
advocate a “demogrant” as part of a move to privatize Social Security; this demogrant is a fixed,
guaranteed (but small) public pension payment that is not means tested, and hence should avoid many of
the disincentive effects of means testing.
34  Second, proposals to reform Social Security invariably entail
projections of revenues and benefits.  If individuals respond to means testing by reducing saving, and
                    
     
34At the same time, it is important to note that potential distortionary
effects of means-tested Social Security do not imply that conversion to a
fully-funded system (perhaps privatized) for most workers, coupled with a
means-tested program for the needy, would result in greater inefficiency,
because the conversion of the bulk of the program to fully-funded status may
increase efficiency (Feldstein, 1987).27
hence increasing the likelihood of being eligible for a means-tested retirement program, such projections
are made more complicated.  In particular, estimates of the eligible population based on those who
currently would qualify for a means-tested program are likely to understate actual eligibility for and
participation in a means-tested program, and (depending on the financing) are also likely to overstate
revenues.
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    Mean 2577.3 30767.0
(8835.6) (42475.4)
    Median 500 30239
State supplements .43.53
SSI benefits
Maximum state SSI  .25.19
supplement > 20% of
federal benefit
Maximum SSI  372.4 364.7
benefits, individual (71.2) (57.8)
Maximum SSI  595.3 562.7
benefits, couple (178.3) (133.8)
Less than high school  .88.51









Means are reported, with standard deviations in parentheses.  Data are from
Waves 4 and 5 of the 1984 SIPP panel.  The wealth measures and other
variables are sometimes imputed, but the SIPP does not provide imputation
flags for the variables we use.  Wealth is measured as of Wave 4.  Maximum
SSI benefits is combined federal and state, obtained from the 1985 Green
Book, and is based on current marital status.  Classification of states
providing supplements higher than 20% of the federal benefit is based on
whether the supplement for either an individual or a couple exceeds this
amount.  All estimates are weighted. Table 2: Probits for SSI Participation
____________________________________________________________________________________________
A. Probit Estimates for Male Household Heads Aged 65 and Over
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Less than high school  .05 .05 .05 .05 .05
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01)
Some college-.01 -.01 -.01 -.01 -.01
(.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02)
College graduate -.03 -.03 -.01 -.004 -.01
(.03) (.03) (.02) (.02) (.02)
Black .04 .04 .02 .02 .02
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01)
Never married.04 .05 .04 .04 .05
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01)
Divorced/widowed/ ... .01 .01 .01 .02
separated/spouse absent (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01)
State supplements ... ... -.002 ... ...
SSI benefits (.007)
Maximum state SSI  ... ...... .022 ...
supplement > 20% of  (.007)
federal benefit
Maximum SSI  ... ... ...... .007
benefits (.002)
Pseudo R
2 .11 .11 .23 .25 .24
B. Centiles of Weighted Distribution of Predicted Probabilities for Male Household Heads Aged 40-64,
Based on Estimates in Column (2)
15th 35th 55th 75th 95th 99th Max.
.004 .008 .012 .058 .084 .211 .368
____________________________________________________________________________________________
There are 1948 observations in Panel A.  In the probit estimates partial derivatives of the participation probability
are reported, with standard errors in parentheses.  In column (5), the effect of a $100 change in benefits is reported. 
All estimates are weighted. Table 3: OLS and Median Regression Estimates of Effects of SSI on Saving of Likely Participants,
Based on Alternative  Classifications of  Likely Participants, Male Household
Heads Aged 40-64
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
A. Savings Profiles for Full Sample
Likely participants based on Likely participants based on
Single profile Single profile less than high school education:estimated prob. of participation:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Estimator OLS Median OLS Median OLS Median
Age 40-49 ... ... 3421.9 -1223 3293.7 -1260
´ likely participant (13743.1) (551.3) (13751.1) (545.6)
Age 50-59  ... ... 20684.7 -1332 22945.8 -1360
´ likely participant (13249.0) (529.6) (13181.4) (532.2)
Age 60-64  ... ... -14070.8 -2375 -12000.2 -2328
´ likely participant (17989.2) (712.1) (17922.5) (711.8)
Intercept 2653.3 725 1969.0 61 1972 1287
(5497.1) (259.2) (6145.8) (377.9) (6171.9) (249.3)
Age 50-59  -16116.0 685 -21244.3 1354 -21991.6 1338
(8104.6) (481.6) (9332.6) (504.3) (9367.0) (509.0)
Age 60-64 8398.3  725  14178.4  1271 13501.1 93
(10245.7) (259.2) (12448.7) (247.3) (12507.9) (380.8)
Adjusted/Pseudo R
2 .001 .000 .001 .001 .001 .001
N 3663 3663 3663 3663 3663 3663
B. Savings Profiles for Supplement vs. Non-Supplement States,
Likely Participants Classified on Basis of High Probability of Participation, Median Regressions     
State does not State Max. state Max. state Max. state
supplement supplements supplement > 10% supplement >20% supplement >40%
benefits benefits of federal benefit of federal benefit of federal benefit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Age 40-49 -552 -1775 -1639 -2157 -2267.6
´ likely participant (683.6) (880.6) (939.3) (1339.8) (2167.6)
Age 50-59  -1488 -900 -1766 -1113 -78
´ likely participant (674.2) (847.3) (927.9) (1409.8) (2303.3)
Age 60-64  -1709 -3152 -2337 -4606 -6473
´ likely participant (928.6) (1106.5) (1187.0) (1671.8) (2910.2)
Intercept 579 1825 1659 2170 2170
(337.8) (374.7) (400.6) (557.7) (882.2)
Age 50-59  1097 -925 107 -677 -1697
(523.4) (566.8) (605.3) (836.0) (1316.6)
Age 60-64 1097  2074  1241  2526 4600
(706.1) (751.1) (798.9) (1125.1) (1843.8)
Pseudo R
2 .001 .001 .001 .001 .001
N 1655 2008 1559 694 522
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Saving is measured as the change in total net wealth excluding housing from Wave 4 to Wave 7.  All regressions also include an intercept. 
Probability of SSI participation is based on estimates of the probit model in column (2) of Table 2.  Likely participants in columns (5) and (6) of
Panel A, and "High probability of participation" in Panel B, indicates observations with predicted probability exceeding .058, which is the 75thcentile of the weighted distribution of estimated probabilities.  "Maximum state supplement" refers to supplement for either a couple or an individual
(i.e., the maximum percentage).  All estimates are weighted.  Table 4: Difference-in-Difference Estimates of Effects of SSI on Saving of Likely Participants,
Male Household Heads Aged 40-64,  Median Regressions
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
  No control Add control Continuous state  Only states with federal  Exclude potentially Exclude those with means- Exclude those with work-
variables: variables: supplement measure: administration: misclassified states: tested transfer income: impairing disability:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
a': Age 40-49 -1605 -1630 -4.44 1.30 -3.55 -4.27 -4.74
     ´ likely participant (1293.1) (1491.5) (4.64) (5.68) (3.94) (5.55) (6.02)
     ´ state supplement
b': Age 50-59    375 1096 3.95 2.34      3.47 3.93 5.03
     ´ likely participant (1339.1) (1550.8) (5.36) (6.52) (4.49) (7.60) (7.29)
     ´ state supplement





     ´ likely participant (1651.6) (1903.0) (6.63) (7.97) (5.64) (8.17) (9.45)
     ´ state supplement
Pseudo R
2 .001 .002 .002 .003 .002 .002 .002
N 2349 2349 3663 2121 3418 3474 3124
Allowing saving profiles  Single specification, three cutoffs for participation prob.: 
to differ with tax .012 .058 .084 Total net wealth Total Housing wealth,
treatment of wealth: (55th centile): (75th centile): (95th centile): excluding vehicles: wealth: robust regression:
(8) (9) (9') (9'') (10) (11) (12)
a': Age 40-49 -4.23 7.40 .94 3.89 -3.19 -.16 12.28
**
     ´ likely participant (5.24) (4.44) (5.12) (21.14) (3.32) (2.97) (5.99)
     ´ state supplement
b': Age 50-59  5.39 -16.12
** -9.97
* -5.14 4.68 3.75 3.44
     ´ likely participant (6.10) (4.91) (6.07) (14.60) (3.83) (3.41) (6.90)
     ´ state supplement







     ´ likely participant (7.50) (6.97) (7.60) (23.95) (4.67) (4.02) (8.42)
     ´ state supplement
Pseudo R
2 .002 .003 .002 .002 ...
N 3663 3663 3663 3663 3663
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Saving is measured as the change in total net wealth excluding housing from Wave 4 to Wave 7.  Likely participants are classified based on high probability of participation.  See notes to Table 3 for
additional details.  The parameters a', b', and g' refer to equation (3).  In all specifications except (1), controls for education, race, and marital status are included, in the same form as in the probits in
Table 2.  In all specifications except (1) and (2), the continuous measure of SSI supplements is used.  In specification (8), interactions of a dummy variable for states with estate or inheritance taxes,
and a dummy variable for states with gift taxes, both interacted with the age dummy variables, are added to the regressions, allowing different intercepts and slopes of the savings profile for each of
these types of states.   Except in specifications (9)-(9''), the same .058 cutoff for defining likely participants is used as in Panel B of Table 3.  In specification (12), robust regression is used instead of
median regression, because there was a very large spike (about one-quarter of the sample) at zero.  Robust regression results using total net wealth excluding housing were qualitatively similar to the
median regression results; in particular, only the estimate of g' was negative and significant at the five-percent level.  Estimates significant at the five-percent level are denoted with a '**', and those atthe ten-percent level with a '*'.  All estimates are weighted except specification (12).Table 5: Savings Profiles Implied by Median Estimates
______________________________________________________________________________________________________
Using dummy variable for Using continuous
supplement > 20% of federal benefit:  supplement measure:
(1) (2)
Likely participant, age 40-49, 13 607.6
in supplement state
Likely participant, age 50-59, 380 91.3
in supplement state
Likely participant, age 60-64, 90 215.4
in supplement state
Likely participant, age 40-49, 27 27.2
in non-supplement state
Likely participant, age 50-59, 188 0
in non-supplement state
Likely participant, age 60-64, -33 303
in non-supplement state
Unlikely participant, age 40-49, 2170 1483.8
in supplement state
Unlikely participant, age 50-59, 1493 1014.5
in supplement state
Unlikely participant, age 60-64, 4696 3982.4
in supplement state
Unlikely participant, age 40-49, 579 899.0
in non-supplement state
Unlikely participant, age 50-59, 1676 1600
in non-supplement state
Unlikely participant, age 60-64, 1676 2050
in non-supplement state
______________________________________________________________________________________________________
In column (1), estimates are based on specification (1) from Table 4.  In column (2), estimates are based on the same
specification as in column (3) of Table 4, excluding the control variables.  For this specification the estimates (standard errors) of
a', b', and g' were: -4.32 (4.69), 4.96 (5.30), and -14.82 (6.57).  Estimates of the saving profiles in states that supplement are
based on mean supplement for those states.   See notes to Tables 3 and 4 for additional details.Table 6: Difference-in-Difference Estimates of Effects of SSI on Labor Supply Measures for Likely Participants,
Male Household Heads Aged 40-64
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Employment Hours Empl. probit Hours tobit, Probit for
probit: tobit: cond. on lagged empl.cond. on lagged hours: reduced hours:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
a': Age 40-49 .01 .50 .02 1.01 -.02
     ´ likely participant (.02) (.97) (.02) (.72) (.02)
     ´ state supplement
b': Age 50-59   -.004 .11 -.01 -.68 .005
     ´ likely participant (.01) (1.01) (.01) (.76) (.02)
     ´ state supplement
g': Age 60-64  -.01 -.64 .02 .81 -.03
     ´ likely participant (.02) (1.33) (.02) (1.01) (.03)
     ´ state supplement
(g'-a') -.02 -1.14 ... ... ...
(.02) (1.64)
Age 50-59 -.12 -6.24 -.04 -2.65 .01
(.02) (1.15) (.02) (.85) (.02)
Age 60-64 -.31 -22.28 -.12 -9.07 -.02
(.02) (1.53) (.02) (1.17) (.03)
Lagged employment ... ... .36 ... ...
(.01)
Lagged hours ... ... ... .81 ...
(.02)
Adjusted R-squared/ .15 .02 .54 .10 .01
Pseudo R-squared
N 3257 3257 3178 3178 3178
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
See notes to Table 3 for details.  Likely participants are classified based on high probability of participation.  The parameters a', b', and g' refer to
equation (3).  The estimated coefficients of age 50-59 and age 60-64 correspond to h and q in equation (3).  In columns (1), (3), and (5) partial
derivatives of probability are reported, with standard errors in parentheses.  All specifications include controls for education, race, and marital status;
the variables are entered as in the probits in Table 2.  Lagged employment and hours are taken from two waves (eight months) prior.  If we instead
use data from one year later, there are far more missing observations because the interviewed sample was reduced.  The same .058 cutoff for
defining likely participants is used as in Table 4 and Panel B of Table 3.  The maximum state supplement is defined in terms of 100s of dollars. 
Estimates significant at the five-percent level are denoted with a '**', and those at the ten-percent level with a '*'. Appendix Table A1: State SSI Supplemental Maximum Benefits, 1985
_______________________________________________________________________________________
State Individuals Couples> 20% of Federal
Benefit
Alabama 0 0 No
Arizona 0 0 No
Arkansas 0 0 No
California 179 448 Yes
Colorado 58 278 Yes
Connecticut 172 119 Yes
Delaware 0 0 No
Washington, D.C. 15 30 No
Florida 0 0 No
Georgia 0 0 No
Hawaii 5 9 No
Illinois 35 34 No
Indiana 0 0 No
Iowa 0 0 No
Kansas 0 0 No
Kentucky 0 0 No
Louisiana 0 0 No
Maine 10 15 No
Maryland 0 0 No
Massachusetts 129 202 Yes
Michigan 27 40 No
Minnesota 35 66 No
Missouri 0 0 No
Montana 0 0 No
Nebraska 61 89 No
Nevada 37 74 No
New Hampshire 27 21 No
New Jersey 31 25 No
New York 61 76 No
North Carolina 0 0 No
North Dakota 0 0 No
Ohio 0 0 No
Oklahoma 60 120 Yes
Oregon 2 0 No
Pennsylvania 32 49 No
Rhode Island 54 102 Yes
South Carolina 0 0 No
Tennessee 0 0 No
Texas 0 0 No
Utah 10 20 No
Vermont 53  97 No
Virginia 0 0 No
Washington 38 37 No
Wisconsin 100 161 Yes
_______________________________________________________________________________________
Sample is restricted to states individually identified in the SIPP.  The maximum federal benefits were $325
for individuals, and $488 for couples.  Figures were taken from the 1985 Green Book.  Classification in
column (3) is based on maximum benefit for either an individual or a couple.   In California and Wisconsin,
the cash value of food stamps is included in the supplement (Zedlewski and Meyer, 1989).  For a small
number of individuals living with non-recipients or ineligible spouses, the maximum benefit is reduced. Appendix Table A2: Difference-in-Difference Estimates of Effects of SSI
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Pooled equation:
Y = a×Part×Age4049  + b×Part×Age5059 + g×Part×Age6064 + d + h×Age5059 + q×Age6064
+ a'×Part×Age4049×Supp  + b'×Part×Age5059×Supp + g'×Part×Age6064×Supp
+ d'×Supp + h'×Age5059×Supp + q'×Age6064×Supp
Estimates:
1. (Y|Supp=1,Part=1,Age6064=1 - Y|Supp=1,Part=0,Age6064=1) - (Y|Supp=0,Part=1,Age6064=1 - Y|Supp=0,Part=0,Age6064=1)  =
Difference-in-difference estimate of effect of state SSI supplement on level of Y for likely participants aged 60-64 =
(g + d + q  + g' + d' + q' - d - q - d' - q') - (g + d + q - d - q ) = g'
2. {(Y|Supp=1,Part=1,Age6064=1 - Y|Supp=1,Part=1,Age4049=1) - (Y|Supp=1,Part=0,Age6064=1 - Y|Supp=1,Part=0,Ag4049=1)}
  - {(Y|Supp=0,Part=1,Age6064=1 - Y|Supp=0,Part=1,Age4049=1) - (Y|Supp=0,Part=0,Age6064=1 - Y|Supp=0,Part=0,Ag4049=1)}
Difference-in-difference estimate of effect of state SSI supplement on change in Y for likely participants from
age 40-49 to age 60-64 =
{(g + d + q + g' + d' + q' - a - d - a' - d') - (d + q + d' + q' - d - d')} - {(g + d + q - a - d) - (d + q - d)} = g' - a'
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Y is an unconditional expectation.  Y|... is a conditional expectation. 